Mediterranean Europe and the Portuguese Accession Negotiations to the European Economic Community

Introduction

Enlargement is on the European Union’s (EU) agenda for more than five decades now. Much has been though, discussed and written about it, especially in the near past and in particular about the 2004 Eastern enlargement, whose 10th anniversary was just celebrated. Meanwhile, enlargement studies have become a new area of study[1], but literature on the second and third enlargement is still somewhat scarce, even though a younger generation of researchers[2] is starting to explore this subject.

The European Economic Community’s (EEC) third enlargement round, often considered as “Mediterranean enlargement”[3], brought up a series of tensions between member states, which would require a great amount of time and effort to be solved. Bigger issues, such as the British budget contribution, the community budget and the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) reforms, were at the centre of EEC’s agenda in the late 1970-80’s and, ultimately, British and French national interests on these matters will prevail, proving that member states used the prospect of enlargement to achieve particular policy goals, and only after those accomplishments, member states agreed on concluding the third enlargement.

This article analyses, from an historical perspective, the influence that the Mediterranean dimension (countries of this geographical area and their commercial, agricultural and industrial relations), had on the Portuguese accession negotiations to the EEC, held between 1978 and 1985. More specifically, it is the purpose of the article to provide a clear view on the positions taken by the Mediterranean states, especially France, on the Portuguese accession negotiations, by taking stock of the positions sustained throughout negotiations and the demands made, such as the creation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programme, to avoid any further gridlock that would jeopardize enlargement.

 

Preparing for accession

 

After years of quiet hesitation, political denial, but economic convenience, the relationship between Portugal and the EEC will alter, especially after the come-to-office of the I Constitutional Government, led by Prime-minister Mário Soares, in July 1976. First, the Government’s Programme[4] introduced the principle of accession and secondly Prime-minister Soares delegated full power on his Foreign Affairs Minister, José Medeiros Ferreira, to make all the necessary arrangements.

Following the strategy set up for this new European venture, Soares’ European tour, from February 14 to March 12, 1977, during which he visited all member states’ capitals, had, from the start, two purposes, one official and another strategic: the official was to present the Portuguese point of view on European integration; the tactical was the intention to deliver in the near future the application for membership[5]. The last of these objectives was clear and was even identified by the European Commission, which plainly emphasized that the purpose of these visits was to explain the reasons behind the membership application[6], using democracy as its main argument.

Along these visits it became obvious that, although none of the member states was completely against to a future Portuguese EEC accession, and all supported and commended the Portuguese commitment towards democracy, they had different readings on the process. Denmark, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) fully supported the Portuguese membership: the Danish economy wasn’t a competitor with the Portuguese one, neither was its agriculture or industry, and besides Portugal’s joining the EEC would increase the weight of the smaller countries and would act as an intermediary to African countries; the Federal Republic of Germany was aware of the political, economic and institutional challenges, but was favorable; as well as the UK which mainly considered accession as a support for democracy in the country.

In the opposite side, Belgium was the proponent of an intermediate status between association and membership; France was concerned with the agricultural dossier, even if primarily related to Spain, but it was by far the member state which expressed more reluctance; and so was Italy about the same dossier and also concerning the transfer of funds; Ireland had the same previous concern and, although it didn’t oppose to membership, it had reservations because there would be one more poor country competing for the same community funds; last, but not least, Luxembourg was concerned first and foremost with the free movement of workers, i.e., Portuguese emigrants[7].

In conclusion, there were some constrains, especially from France and Italy due to issues related to agriculture and CAP reform, for which the two would promote their products, which, in turn, finds opposition in the Northern countries. As for Italy, it was concerned, although at the political level it clearly supported the future enlargement, maybe in the prospect of leading in the future, within the EEC, the group of Southern European states; nonetheless, Portuguese and Spanish’s accession – countries that had competing agricultural productions with the Italian Mezzogiorno –, was feared by certain Italian sectors, namely conservative sectors which argued that the EEC should extend the protections given to continental productions, such as meat, dairy and cereals, as well as to the typically Mediterranean products, such as fruit and vegetables, wine and olive oil[8].

After the European tour, even though Mário Soares declares that there was “great comprehension and support even in those countries that, sometimes, the Portuguese and foreign press, considered reluctant”[9], he also confessed that “despite the friendly and supportive atmosphere that we have received in all capitals, it is clear that there are some doubts and resistances. Our conditions were still somewhat fuzzy and incomplete – despite the Government’s efforts – and I was wondering how much each country would pay for our membership”[10]. Indeed, that is the right question to make: how much is each member state, and particularly those affected by a certain new member state, ready to pay or, in a different sense, what concessions is ready to make and in change of what?

By that time, there was still much skepticism about whether the answer regarding the application for membership would be positive, since member states were not only dealing with the contradictions between political and economic interests, which often resulted in inconsistent or confused answers, as they were more concerned with their immediate economic problems than with any future enlargement. Therefore, as they identify enlargement’s specific implications, “national governments stumble in their initial commitments” towards it[11] and will use enlargement individually to pursue their interests and collectively to show the EEC internal problems[12]. And even though more recently enlargement policy has suffered some rearrangements due to less successful experiences, these new arrangements have strengthen member statesʼ control over this policy, which  have, in fact, “also been showing less scruple in instrumentalising enlargement for domestic political gains”[13]; but that was already a solid reality by the time of the Iberian enlargement, which allowed enlargement to be held hostage of different domestic agendas and also legitimized that member states capitalized enlargement on their personal behalf[14].

 

Mediterranean enlargement in position

 

It was only in 1973, sixteen years after the establishment of the EEC, that it had its first enlargement. However, it took only two more years until a new round of accession requests would be presented. In a year and a half – from April 24, 1974 until November 20, 1975 –, the three southern European dictatorship regimes were overturned, and it would take little time until all turn themselves towards the EEC, which was, somehow, caught up by surprise by this wave of democratization occurred on the south European countries.

With the overturn of the authoritarian regimes in southern Europe, Portugal, Greece and Spain will initiate their path towards democracy. If it was important for the EEC to have democratic regimes in Southern Europe, and both member states and EEC representatives granted their commitment towards it, enlargement would have economic costs and interfere with how the EEC was established in the 1980’s, especially from an economic point of view. In 1976, still Portugal and Spain had not presented their accession requests, it was acknowledged that “the relative homogeneity of the Community will be decreased as countries with developing economies are included”[15] and, by 1978, when the three candidates were in different stages of the accession process, the Commission sends a communication to the Council (General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement), where it presents the economic difficulties[16] and institutional problems posed by enlargement.

In the above mentioned report, some problems facing the EEC with the prospect of enlargement are addressed, as well as the risks that it incurs if it doesn’t deal with them properly. This document was, in fact, the first attempt to look enlargement in a global perspective[17], and although it has few concrete proposals, it contains an underlying important recommendation: do not complete enlargement endangering the foundations and objectives of the EEC.

The top economic problems of the list point lower degree of economic development of the three candidates compared to the member states, which would increase the number of regions and sectors in difficulty; whereas the industrial and social structures of the candidates countries were also very different from those of the member states, which would therefore undermine the cohesion of the common market and the achievement of the economic and monetary union.

The prospect of further enlargement posed a number of obstacles in several areas, such as in industry, energy, employment, and of course agriculture, with the increasing of the number of people working in this activity, the surplus production of certain Mediterranean products (wine, olive oil, some fruits and vegetables), the need to improve the structure of production and its quality[18].

Nearly a month later, by May 19, 1978, Lorenzo Natali sends the Commission’s Opinion[19] to the Council. The Opinion includes specific analysis on multiple items. Overall it concludes that the economic impact of Portugal’s accession will be quite limited, given the relative weight of the Portuguese economy, which represents just 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the EEC and just 3% of the population. Paradoxically, the low degree of development of the Portuguese economy would contribute to increasing disparities, which in turn would decrease cohesion and stress heterogeneity within the EEC, and hinder the process of decision[20].

In a sectoral analysis, the Opinion examines the contributions of different economic sectors to the GDP, their organization and structure, number of people it employs, and lists the main focus of disharmony with the EEC, while portrays a country where agriculture employed 28% of its active population, but only contributed with 12% to the GDP, and it wasn’t self-sufficient in various products including some essential products, such as milk and meat; fisheries’ resources, on the other hand, were not sufficiently exploited; while industry was dominated by traditional sectors and was largely dependent of the importation of raw materials; transport infrastructures were not suitable, and the conditions of life and work were much lower than those of the EEC.

In the 1980’s, the EEC had not only a high level of economic development, as its structures were also comparatively homogeneous. Greece, Portugal and even Spain, on the other hand, were economically less developed countries and by joining the EEC they would enhance the already existing difficulties in some regions and economic sectors. In addition, the existing agricultural and industrial structures in all three countries were far different from those of the member states. Therefore, the concern that enlargement could jeopardize EEC’s economic accomplishments and the cohesion of the common market was real, but there were indeed few grounds for refusing membership to the three applicants.

 

Battling for accession and the French European relaunch

 

Accession negotiations started for Portugal in October 17, 1978 and a few months later (February 5, 1979) for Spain. While Greece’s accession negotiations lasted for only two years, the Portuguese and Spanish lasted for six/seven years. Whereas a good personal relationship between Konstantínos Karamanlis and Giscard d’Estaing speeded up Greece’s negotiations and made it easier to accomplish accession, there was “considerable latent opposition within the Community to Iberian enlargement. France was the most hostile, while the Benelux countries were reluctant, and Italy uncomfortably thorn between Latin solidarity and the rivalries of Mediterranean agriculture”[21]. As Loukas Tsoukalis points out “the rhetoric on Western democratic ideals gradually gave way to heated discussions about the price of peaches and olive oil”[22]. In fact, and ever since it began, that the EU’s enlargement policy has become politicized[23] and remains above all a “key political process”[24], which makes that “the most lengthy and arduous part of the negotiations is not the accession negotiations between the Union and the applicant countries at ministerial or ambassadorial level, but the internal discussions of the Union itself”[25].

The EEC was committed to implement structural reforms as a key requirement to meet its internal and external obligations related to enlargement[26], by arguing that enlargement and the strengthening of common policies should be pursued in parallel and simultaneously, but the former could not ever be a condition to the later[27].

Thus, in parallel with the accession negotiations, member states decided to expand and refocus certain Community instruments (particularly in agricultural and financial sectors) to deal with the three accessions (e.g. regional and social funds), to ensure that there would actually occur a considerable transfer of resources to the south of the EEC, so that future member states might receive everything they could absorb[28].

Nonetheless, member states didn’t consider enlargement as an opportunity to enhance reforms, but rather as “a source of misunderstanding about major policy issues and as an obstacle to further development of the Community in general”[29]. But there were other difficulties, such as a paralyzed decision-making process, a weak Commission, an agricultural policy seemingly out of control[30].

Initially, three considerations sustained the French position regarding the Portuguese membership application: first, the great distance that separated Portuguese economic development and those of the member states; secondly, the negative effects for French agriculture; and third and last, the advantages that France would get with the Portuguese accession, chiefly in sectors like television, car industry, steel and computer science. As for the second aspect, free movement of Portuguese agricultural products’ effects were feared by the French government for two reasons: the damage it could cause to French agriculture and the consequences it might had on the results of the 1978 legislative elections, the latter being the main reason[31].

Between 1977 and 1980, the prospect of new members did not pose special difficulties for France. That would, however, change starting June 5, 1980, with the abrupt and sudden change of attitude of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. A year later, the French government presented to the other member states and European institutions the Mémorandum sur la Relance Européenne[32], document which suggests the consolidation and development of common policies, the improvement of EEC functioning and institutional cooperation, so that a European relaunch would happen. This is the “official” statement; yet, the coming up of French elections and the “need” to please French farmers was the main reason behind this pause[33].

Between May 1981 and the end of the following year, the French position had two axes: to impose its views to its partners and to make Portugal and Spain wait, until suitable solutions to the problems posed by enlargement were found, so not to repeat the Greek experience[34], which ironically joined on the conditions it joined because of the French patronage, under the motto “join first, negotiate later”. Moreover, in this period, French position will be characterized by the refusal to initiate the most sensitive chapters, and to establish any future date for accession[35], a position which will not be shaken. Nevertheless, the French knew that they couldn’t postpone negotiations indefinitely, so slowly they began to progress.

Between 1981 and 1982, Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt left office and were substituted respectively by François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, who hadn’t the same good personal relationship than their predecessors had. In 1982, there will also be elections in the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark and Italy, all of which with government’s change. At Community level, the nine member states as a whole formed a less cohesive group than the six founding members. On the other hand, a sense of direction was lacking in the formulation of common policies, and the internal crisis that occurred that spring led the EEC, in an attempt to deal simultaneously with several problems, on the verge of paralysis. Negotiations, on the other hand, although never formally stopped, were in fact dependent on the resolution of community issues.

The French left and particularly the Socialist Party had a very particular position regarding the enlargement of the EEC, which will influence this dossier as long as the party is in office. Socialist Party as well as Communist Party’s opposition to enlargement wasn’t a matter of principle, but a “political opposition”, an electoral opposition properly said, since part of its constituency were small farmers and fisherman, we were against enlargement[36].

Although, by that time, much of the initial commitment of member states had disappeared, and a decline in political will to make a success of enlargement was obvious, negotiations continued. Still in 1982, the Council requested the Commission to work on an inventory[37] on issues related to enlargement, regarding both common policies and individual implications for each member state[38], which resulted on the report “Problems of Enlargement – Taking Stock and Proposals”, whose content revealed the existing obstacles concerning enlargement, divided in two categories: internal and thrown up by negotiations, with detailed analysis on four sectors (agriculture, fisheries, industry and budgetary matters).

Later that year, during the Copenhagen European Council (December 3-4, 1982), Danish Prime-minister Poul Schlüter reaffirmed the EEC’s political commitment in favor of enlargement and welcomed the Commission’s Inventory, which itself was a breakthrough in the enlargement process, outlining the way for the accession process[39]. The Council also recommended that the Commission should explore with the candidates the possibility to introduce internal measures before accession in order to prepare their economy, especially on the most sensitive sectors. But the internal reform had stopped: CAP reform and the financing of the EEC, particularly in view of the contribution of the member states had threatened, more than once, the decision process, which, in turn, threatened the negotiations.

Meanwhile, “the heart” of negotiations was reached: agriculture. One by one the lesser issues had been exceeded, so during 1983 and 1984 the agricultural dossier would be seriously debated, until “the decisive moment for the negotiations on the agriculture chapter would be reached in the spring of 1984 during the French Presidency, in which Mitterrand would be called upon to decide between the claims of farmers in southern France or veto the applications of two southern European statesˮ[40].

By the second half of 1983, Greece will hold for the first time the rotating presidency of the Council and by then Portugal was already exhausted with the difficulties about the Mediterranean products (olive oil, wine, fruit and vegetables), affecting especially Spain, but in which Portugal saw itself dragged into[41]. Both the Hellenic President Konstantine Karamanlis and Prime-minister Andreas Papandreou confirmed their support for Portuguese membership, but the latter declared soon after to be “optimistic with reservations” about this issue, which was in line with his general approach of taking full advantage of the EEC and contribute the least[42], which highly displeased the European leaders.

To this respect, Lorena Ruano explains how the CAP delayed Spainʼs accession and how specific institutional biases – such as the bilateral structure of the negotiations, CAP being protected from any pressure regarding enlargement, and member states’ national positions with regard to enlargement being mixed, with no given clear priority –, worked in favour of agricultural interests over other broader economic and political interests[43], such as the democratic consolidation.

For Mário Soares, the two Iberian countries couldn’t wait no more. France, on the other hand, continued to repeat that enlargement would not occur without the increase of the EEC’ own resources[44] and without Mediterranean products be taken into account within it[45]. But until July 1984, when the European Parliament elections would occur, France wouldn’t go forward anyway with enlargement. At this point, France’s attitude on linking enlargement to the restructuring of the financial structures of the Community was regarded as seeking “a dual purpose: to use the application of the two Iberian countries as a pretext to impose on other member states a certain EEC ‘way of work’”[46].

Later that year, on October 18, 1983, finally a breakthrough happened: the ministers of agriculture achieved an agreement on the Mediterranean products under the CAP reform, which was considered as a major step towards the progress of negotiations[47]. But soon after, the European Council meeting in Athens (December 4-6), which was in charge of implementing the resolutions of the Stuttgart European Council (to increase financial resources, establish a limit on spending and set a ceiling on agricultural surpluses), not only wasn’t able to achieve any of these goals, as ended in a complete failure, demonstrating that the nature and extent of the EEC’s internal problems required greater political efforts.

The Fontainebleau European Council (June 25-26, 1984) would later become another “standstill-remover”, by reaching an agreement concerning the UK budget compensation, which allowed the implementation of two others, namely the own resources’ increase with a 1.4% VAT ceiling, and budgetary and financial discipline, which led François Mitterrand to speak about a “vigorous revival” of the EEC. Despite this progress, nevertheless, negotiations remained blocked by disagreements between member states, which continued to consider enlargement as a double threat: a threat to the community finances at to some of its economic sectors, mainly agriculture and fisheries.

Christina Schneider argues that candidates and member states negotiate the distribution of enlargement gains and losses between themselves, and that EU’s enlargements happen after large distributional conflicts, when some member states are compensated for their expected losses[48]. She also emphasizes that member states that have the most to lose are the ones which have more incentives to delay negotiations and may use their veto power (since enlargement requires unanimous vote), until the member states that have more to gain from enlargement encourage them, by compensating them with other benefits, in order to overcome the expected losses. In the Iberian or Mediterranean enlargement, this was the case of France and Italy, which wanted CAP compensations.

Since enlargement requires a unanimous decision by the European Council members, they dictate the timings and the rules. That was obvious on several occasions and even when both delegations were about to finish the remaining accession chapters, on the evening of March 21, 1985, France had a last minute question about Spanish wine quotas and fishing boats[49].

And even when negotiations were completed, at that point accession didn’t seemed assured, since Greece was considering vetoing enlargement, since it feared, as it was a recent member state, a large transfer of structural aid funds for the two less developed states (Portugal and Spain), and wanted Greece’s rights to be guaranteed[50]. Bearing that in mind, and in order to overcome that veto’s intention, member states agreed on the creation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programme, through which Greece would receive 2000 million ECUs, while Italy and France benefited in equal proportions.

 

Final comments

 

Both Portugal and Spain accession’s requests entailed a long and complex negotiation process, which wasn’t an “easy, short, nor quiet task”[51]. What might have appeared, at start, to be a simple and fast negotiation, similar to the previous ones[52], ended after almost eight years of negotiations, in which everything interacted with and delayed the Portuguese and Spanish accession. In the end, EEC’s accession treaties were signed in June 12, 1985.

Enlargement is not limited to the change of the political map of Europe, but has implications for the common policies and institutional arrangements of the EEC, therefore gave rise to internal disputes between member states. Enlargement was barely a part of the EEC’s agenda in the 1980’s, and it wasn’t by far its main concern. Community budget, CAP reform, the British reimbursement were main topics that stood on the Community’s agenda alongside with the enlargement. However, until all of them were properly solved to all member states’ content, enlargement was stalled.

Along eight years, it became increasingly difficult not to notice the endless discussions on technical issues and the constant internal difficulties of the EEC when what was actually at stake was the decrease of the EEC’s political interest towards enlargement and the satisfaction of member states’ individual interests in particular common policies. In the end, French interests prevailed and it was thanks to enlargement that the Integrated Mediterranean Programme was established and that France decided to its favor a political-technical issue that lasted for several years[53]. Member states used, therefore, the prospect of enlargement to achieve particular policy goals, such as improvements in decision-making procedures and the reform of CAP, which functioned almost as a precondition for enlargement.

 

 

 

Sources and references

 

Alice Cunha, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiência Portuguesa, Lisboa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2012 [Doctoral Thesis]

Antonio Alonso,  España en el Mercado Común. Del Acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de los Doce, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1985

Archives Historiques de la Commission Européenne, Bruxelles, BAC 250/1980 n.° 64, “Briefing Note for President Jenkins, Venice Summit Meeting: Enlargement – President Giscard’s remarks”, 10 June 80

Archives Historiques de la Commission Européenne, Bruxelles, BAC 250/1980 n.º 5, “Note for the Attention of Mr. F. Spaak, head of the Enlargement Delegation: Portuguese Negotiations – Briefing for your Meeting with Mr. Natali”, 12 June 1980

Arquivo da Fundação Mário Soares, Lisboa, Pasta 833, “Relações Luso-Francesas”, Ambassade de Portugal, Paris, no date [1977], no signature

Arquivo da Fundação Mário Soares, Lisboa, Pasta 836, “Posição dos Estados membros perante o pedido de adesão”, written by Ferreira Marques e Mesquita de Brito, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 18 April 1978

Christina J. Schneider, Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009

Christophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Report No. 6, 2010

Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London, UACES, 1997

COM (78) 120 final, General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement (Communication sent by the Commission to the Council on 20 April 1978), in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/78, Commission, Luxembourg, European Communities

COM (78) 220 final, Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership, in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/78, Commission, European Communities, Luxembourg, 1978

Commission, Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, No. 12, Bruxelles, Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1982

Commission, Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, No. 6, Bruxelles, Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1982

Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 3, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1977

Constantine Vaitsos, Conclusions: Economic Effects of the Second Enlargement, in The Second Enlargement of the EEC – The Integration of Unequal Partners, edited by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1982, pp. 243-268

Diário da Assembleia da República, I Série, n.º 88, 19 March 1977

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union – An Introduction to European Integration, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

___, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2004

Dudley Seers, Introduction: The Second Enlargement in Historical Perspective, in The Second Enlargement of the EEC – The Integration of Unequal Partners, edited by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1982, pp. 1-21

European Communities, European Union – Reports for 1980, in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/80, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1981

François Duchêne, Community Attitudes, in The Second Enlargement of the EEC – The Integration of Unequal Partners, edited by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1982, pp. 25-42

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, in The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 3-29

Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998

Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, A Wider European Community? – Issues and Problems of Further Enlargement, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1976

Geoffrey Pridham, The Arrival of Enlargement Studies: Patterns and Problems, Glasgow, University of Glasgow, 2008

Georges Saunier, Exorciser les Maléfices: François Mitterrand et l’Élargissement à l’Espagne et au Portugal, in Gli Allargamenti della CEE/UE 1961-2004, a cura di Ariane Landuyt and Daniele Pasquinucci, Bologna, il Mulino, 2005, pp. 131-149

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HAEU, Firenze, CPPE-2418, “Lisbon Seeks Greek Aid on EEC”, Financial Times, 19 August 1983

Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union, Oxford, OUP, 2006

Inventory on the problems posed by enlargement for Community policies and for each of the Member States, Supplement 8/82

Jan Van der Harst, Enlargement: The Commission Seeks a Role for Itself, in The European Commission, 1958-72 – History and Memories, edited by Michel Dumoulin, Luxembourg, European Commission, 2007, pp. 533-556

José Medeiros Ferreira, A Nova Era Europeia – De Genebra a Amesterdão, Lisboa, Editorial Notícias, 1999

Juergen B. Donges, A Comunidade Europeia na Encruzilhada, in Integração Económica – Teoria – CEE – A Adesão de Portugal, edited by Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Lisboa, Edições 70, 1983, pp. 275-304

Lars-Erik Cederman, Expansion or Unity? Placing the European Union in Historical Perspective, Towards a New Europe. Stops and Starts in Regional Integration, London, Praeger, 1995

Lorena Ruano, The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: The Story of why the CAP Delayed Spain’s Entry to the EC, Journal of European Integration History, Volume 11, Number 2, 2005, pp. 97-117

Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981

Mário Soares, in Soares Democracia, Maria João Avillez, Lisboa, Público, 2007

Mémorandum sur la relance européenne, in Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, No.11, Luxembourg, Office des Publications Officielles des Communautés Européennes, 1981

Neill Nugent, European Union Enlargement, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

Raimundo Bassols, España en Europa. Historia de la Adhesión (1957-1985), Madrid, Política Exterior, 1995

Richard T. Griffiths, A Dismal Decade? European Integration in the 1970s, in Origins and Evolution of the European Union, edited by Desmond Dinan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 169-190

Roy Jenkins, European Diary, 1977-1981, London, Collins, 1989

Thomas Pedersen, European Union and the EFTA Countries: Enlargement and Integration, London, Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1994

William Wallace, The Reaction of the Community and the Member Governments, in A Community of Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement on the European Communities, Bruges, De Tempel, 1978, pp. 45-53

 


[1] Geoffrey Pridham, The Arrival of Enlargement Studies: Patterns and Problems, Glasgow, University of Glasgow, 2008)

[2] Eirini Karamouzi, Greece’s path to EEC membership, 1974-1979: the view from Brussels, London, London School of Economics, 2011 [Doctoral Thesis]; Alice Cunha, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiência Portuguesa, Lisboa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2012 [Doctoral Thesis]; Vanessa Núñez Peñas, Entre la reforma y la ampliación (1976-1986): las negociaciones hispano-comunitarias en tiempos de transición y approfondissement, Madrid, Complutense University of Madrid, 2013 [Doctoral Thesis]

[3] Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union, Oxford, OUP, 2006; Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union – An Introduction to European Integration, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Neill Nugent, European Union Enlargement, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London, UACES, 1997; Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981; William Wallace, The Reaction of the Community and the Member Governments, in A Community of Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement on the European Communities, Bruges, De Tempel, 1978, pp. 45-53

[4] Available at: http://www.portugal.gov.pt/media/464012/GC01.pdf, accessed December 4, 2014

[5] José Medeiros Ferreira, A Nova Era Europeia – De Genebra a Amesterdão, Lisboa, Editorial Notícias, 1999, p. 11

[6] Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 3, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1977, p. 65

[7] For further readings: Arquivo da Fundação Mário Soares, Lisboa, Pasta 837, “Reacções ao pedido de adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias”, written Fernando d’Oliveira Neves, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, EOI, 10 February 1977; Arquivo da Fundação Mário Soares, Lisboa, Pasta 836, “Posição dos Estados membros perante o pedido de adesão”, written by Ferreira Marques e Mesquita de Brito, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 18 April 1978

[8] Arquivo da Fundação Mário Soares, Lisboa, Pasta 836, “Posição dos Estados membros perante o pedido de adesão”, written Ferreira Marques e Mesquita de Brito, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 18 April 1978, p. 3

[9] Diário da Assembleia da República, I Série, n.º 88, 19 March 1977, p. 3015

[10] Mário Soares, in Soares Democracia, Maria João Avillez, Lisboa, Público, 2007, p. 57

[11] William Wallace, The Reaction of the Community and the Member Governments, in A Community of Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement on the European Communities, Bruges, De Tempel, 1978, p. 47

[12] Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London, UACES, 1997, p. 22

[13] Christophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Report No. 6, 2010, p. 6

[14] Alice Cunha, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiência Portuguesa, Lisboa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2012, p. 192

[15] Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, A Wider European Community? – Issues and Problems of Further Enlargement, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1976, pp. 3-4

[16] It makes a more complete analysis on agriculture, industry, energy, social and regional aspects.

[17] Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981, p. 156

[18] COM (78) 120 final, General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement (Communication sent by the Commission to the Council on 20 April 1978), in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/78, Commission, Luxembourg, European Communities, pp. 9-12

[19] COM (78) 220 final, Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership, in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/78, Commission, European Communities, Luxembourg, 1978

[20] COM (78) 220 final, Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership, in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/78, Commission, Luxembourg, European Communities

[21] Roy Jenkins, European Diary, 1977-1981, London, Collins, 1989, pp. 199-200

[22] L. Tsoukalis, The European Community, cit., p. 136

[23] Thomas Pedersen, European Union and the EFTA Countries: Enlargement and Integration, London, Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1994, p. 138

[24] Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, in The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 3

[25] Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, p. 31

[26] European Communities, European Union – Reports for 1980, in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/80, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1981

[27] Archives Historiques de la Commission Européenne (AHCE), Bruxelles, BAC 250/1980 n.° 64, “Briefing Note for President Jenkins, Venice Summit Meeting: Enlargement – President Giscard’s remarks”, 10 June 80

[28] AHCE, Bruxelles, BAC 250/1980 n.º 5, “Note for the Attention of Mr. F. Spaak, head of the Enlargement Delegation: Portuguese Negotiations – Briefing for your Meeting with Mr. Natali”, 12 June 1980

[29] Juergen B. Donges, A Comunidade Europeia na Encruzilhada, in Integração Económica – Teoria – CEE – A Adesão de Portugal, edited by Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Lisboa, Edições 70, 1983, p. 276

[30] D. Dinan, Ever Closer, cit., p. 70

[31] Arquivo da Fundação Mário Soares, Lisboa, Pasta 833, “Relações Luso-Francesas”, Ambassade de Portugal, Paris, no date [1977], no signature, pp. 1, 3-4

[32] Mémorandum sur la relance européenne, in Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, No.11, Luxembourg, Office des Publications Officielles des Communautés Européennes, 1981

[33] Raimundo Bassols, España en Europa. Historia de la Adhesión (1957-1985), Madrid, Política Exterior, 1995, p. 246

[34] Georges Saunier, Exorciser les Maléfices: François Mitterrand et l’Élargissement à l’Espagne et au Portugal, in Gli Allargamenti della CEE/UE 1961-2004, a cura di Ariane Landuyt and Daniele Pasquinucci, Bologna, il Mulino, 2005, p. 137

[35] G. Saunier, Exorciser les Maléfices, cit., p. 142

[36] G. Saunier, Exorciser les Maléfices, cit., p. 136

[37] Inventory on the problems posed by enlargement for Community policies and for each of the Member States, Supplement 8/82

[38] Commission, Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, No. 6, Bruxelles, Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1982, p. 17

[39] Commission, Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, No. 12, Bruxelles, Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1982, p. 74

[40] Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Firenze, CPPE-2418, “European Community: Ten to Twelve?ˮ, The Economist, 27 August 1983

[41] HAEU, Firenze, CPPE-2418, “Lisbon Seeks Greek Aid on EEC”, Financial Times, 19 August 1983

[42] Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2004, p. 186

[43] Lorena Ruano, The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: The Story of why the CAP Delayed Spain’s Entry to the EC, Journal of European Integration History, Volume 11, Number 2, 2005, pp. 97-117

[44] HAEU, Firenze, CPPE-2418, “L’Entrée de l’Espagne et du Portugal dans la C.E.E. Est Liée à l’Augmentation des Ressources Communautaires”, Le Monde, 19 October 1983

[45] HAEU, Firenze, CPPE-2418, “France Resists Portuguese and Spanish Pressure on Accession”, Financial Times, 18 October 1983

[46] HAEU, Firenze, CPPE -2418, “Le Portugal menace de se tourner vers d’autres horizons”, Le Monde, 26 October 1983

[47] On the subject: HAEU, Firenze, CPPE-2418, “Accordo nella CEE «verde» sui prodotti mediterranei – Spianata la strada all’ingresso di Spagna e Portogallo”, Il Giornale, 19 October 1983; “Huile d’Olive, Fruits et Légumes: Accord des Dix pour Calmer Gonzalez et Soares”, Le Soir, 19 October 1983; “Boost to Spain and Portugal’s Hopes on EEC Entry”, Financial Times, 19 October 1983; “EEC Removes Barrier to Spain and Portugal”, The Irish Times, 19 October 1983; “Spain and Portugal: An Inch Closer”, The Economist, 22 October 1983

[48] Christina J. Schneider, Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 183

[49] Antonio Alonso,  España en el Mercado Común. Del Acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de los Doce, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1985, p. 201)

[50] C. Schneider, Conflit, cit., p. 8

[51] R. Bassols, España en Europa, cit., p. 1

[52] British, Danish and Irish negotiations lasted for one year and seven months, and the Greek two years and ten months.

[53] G. Saunier, Exorciser les Maléfices, cit., pp. 148-149

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    By: Alice Cunha

    Alice Cunha is PhD in Contemporary History (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2013), MA in International Relations-European Studies (Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 2006) and BA in Political Science (Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 2001). She is currently research fellow at Instituto de História Contemporânea, where she is working on a postdoctoral research project on pre-accession aid to Portugal. Her latest publications include Portugal e as Organizações Internacionais: Comportamentos, Mensagens e Impactos (with Aurora Almada Santos and Yvette Santos, forthcoming); “A Europa no Discurso Parlamentar Português: Os Debates Plenários entre 1985 e 2011”, in Relações Internacionais, n.º 40, 2013 (with Maria Teresa Paulo); “Portugal no Centro da Europa: As Presidências Portuguesas do Conselho da União Europeia (1992, 2000 e 2007)”, in Ler História, n.º 64, 2013. Her research interests mainly focus on enlargement studies, Europeanization and history of European integration;

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